In this paper we present a unified approach to solving contracting problems with full information in models driven by Brownian Motion. We apply the stochastic maximum principle to give necessary and sufficient conditions for contracts that implement the so-called first-best solution. The optimal contract is proportional to the difference between the underlying process controlled by the agent and a stochastic, state-contingent benchmark. Our methodology covers a number of frameworks considered in the existing literature. The main finance applications of this theory are optimal compensation of company executives and of portfolio managers.
Introduction
In recent years there has been a significant revival of interest in the so-called risk-sharing problems and principal-agent problems from economics and finance, especially in continuous time models. Main applications in finance include optimal reward of portfolio managers and optimal compensation of company executives.
The problem involves an interaction between two parties to a contract: an agent and a principal. Through the contract, the principal tries to induce the agent to act in line with the principal's interests. In our setting, both the principal and the agent have full information. In such a case, the problem is known as risk-sharing, since the optimal solution maximizes a combination of the objective functions of the principal and the agent, and represents the best way to share the risk between them. This solution is called the first-best solution. However, in addition to risk-sharing, we focus on the question of finding as simple as possible contracts which induce the agent to implement actions which will lead to the principal attaining the first-best utility.
In this paper, we consider principal-agent problems in continuous time, in which both the volatility (the diffusion coefficient) and the drift of the underlying process can be controlled by the agent. The pioneering paper in the continuous-time framework is Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) [5] , which showed that if both the principal and the agent have exponential utilities, then the optimal contract is linear. Their framework, however, is not that of risk-sharing, but of so-called "hidden information" or "moral hazard" case: the principal cannot directly observe the actions of the agent, who controls the drift only. We consider the (harder) hidden information case in a follow-up paper, Cvitanić, Wan and Zhang (2005) [2] , in more general models.
Here, as mentioned above, we study the full information case, in which the principal can observe the agent's actions. Although often less realistic than the hidden information case, we would like to point out that our full information framework is directly applicable to the important finance problem of optimal reward of portfolio managers. We will see that in such a context the optimal contracts do not require observing the manager's actions anyway. We would also like to point out that the extension to continuous-time models is important for these reasons: such a model is appropriate for portfolio management applications, and it also brings the principal-agent literature in line with popular option pricing models. This is especially important now when US companies are required to price employee/executive options.
In the existing literature under full information, it is usually assumed that the principal would force the agent to implement the controls which are best for the principal, the firstbest solution. Instead, we study the implementability of the first-best solution by relatively simple contracts, and show that the contract that implements the solution is proportional to the difference between the terminal value of the underlying process and a stochastic, state-contingent benchmark. This should be of significant interest in financial economics, because it justifies the use of linear contracts (paying "shares" rather than "options"), as long as we allow the remaining payment to be a random outcome of a specific benchmark portfolio. It can also be interpreted, in the firm context, as a contract in which the principal sells the firm to the agent in exchange for a specific random payment at a given future time.
Literature on the first-best case in continuous time includes Müller (1998 Müller ( , 2000 who finds the solution in the exponential utilities case, when the drift is controled, and shows how it can be approximated by control revisions taking place at discrete times. Very general framework with several agents and recursive utilities is considered in Duffie, Geoffard and Skiadas (1994) and Dumas, Uppal and Wang (2000) . Ou-Yang (2003) [12] also considers the principal-agent problem in the context of delegated portfolio management. In his paper, the agent controls the volatility and the drift simultaneously. While he restricts the family of allowable contracts, motivated by the fact that the principal may not observe full information, the restricted solution of his problem turns out to be the same as the solution of our full information problem, and thus the restriction does not really matter. That article uses Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations as the technical tool. In Cadenillas, Cvitanić and Zapatero (2003) [1] the results of Ou-Yang (2003) [12] have been generalized to a setting where the drift is also controlled by the agent independently of the volatility, and the principal observes it. They use duality-martingale methods, familiar from the portfolio optimization theory. Because of the limitations of that approach, the results of those two papers are obtained in the setting of linear dynamics (although the cost function is allowed to be nonlinear). Larsen (2005) [6] solves numerically the case with power utilities for the linear, portfolio delegation case, for contracts which depend only on the final value of the portfolio.
While this and other existing literature usually searches for optimal contracts in a specific, reduced family of contracts, we consider completely general contracts, with general diffusion dynamics for the underlying process, and we have general utility functions (separable or not separable) and a general cost function. However, as mentioned above, our contracts often turn out to be of simple form allowed by usual restricted families. We are able to deal with such a general framework by using the "stochastic maximum principle" method of stochastic control theory. (For other applications of stochastic maximum principle in finance, see the recent book by Oksendal and Sulem 2004 [11] .) In general, it is more straightforward to find explicit solutions (when they exist) from the characterization we obtain, compared to the above mentioned methods.
We do not discuss the existence of the optimal control. Instead, the stochastic maximum principle enables us to characterize the optimal contract via a solution to Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (FBSDEs), possibly fully coupled. For some of these there is a theory that guarantees existence. However, in general, it is not known under which general conditions these equations have a solution. Nevertheless, we can find optimal contracts in many examples. The stochastic maximum principle is covered in the book Yong and Zhou (1999) [15] , while FBSDEs are studied in the monograph Ma and Yong (1999) [8] .
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we set up the contracting problem with full information and we find the first-best solution, the one that corresponds to the best controls from the principal's point of view. In Section 3 we show that those controls are implementable, that is, there is a contract which induces the agent to implement the firstbest controls. We present some examples in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5, mentioning possible further research topics.
The First-Best Solution
Because we assume that the principal can observe the actions of the agent, it turns out that the principal can induce the agent to use the controls which are optimal for the principal, called the first-best solution. We find the first-best controls in this section. The contract that achieves this solution is called the first-best contract, and we study it in the subsequent section.
The model
Let {W t } t≥0 be a d-dimensional Brownian Motion on a probability space (Ω, F, P ) and denote by F := {F t } t≤T its augmented filtration on the interval [0, T ]. The controlled state process is denoted X = X u,v and its dynamics are given by
, and f is a function taking values in IR, possibly random and such that, as a process, it is F-adapted. The notation xy for two vectors x, y ∈ IR d indicates the inner product. In the principal-agent problems, the principal gives the agent compensation C T = F (ω, X) at time T , where F : Ω × C[0, T ] → IR is a (deterministic) mapping such that C T is F T measurable. We say that F is a contract. One of the main results of the paper is that the optimal contract, for the problem below, will be of the form F (ω, X) = X T − B T (ω) for some F T -measurable random variable ("benchmark") B T . The agent chooses the controls u and v, in order to maximize his utility
is the accumulated cost of the agent, and with a slight abuse of notation we use notation V 1 both for the objective function and its maximum. We say a contract F is implementable if there exists a pair (u
The principal maximizes her utility
where the maximum is over all implementable contracts F such that the following participation constraint or individual rationality (IR) constraint holds:
Functions U 1 and U 2 are utility functions of the agent and the principal. Function g is a penalty function on the agent's effort. Constant R is the reservation utility of the agent and represents the value of the agent's outside opportunities, the minimum value he requires to accept the job. The typical cases studied in the literature are the separable utility case with U 1 (x, y) = U 1 (x) − y, and the non-separable case with U 1 (x, y) = U 1 (x − y), where, with a slight abuse of notation, we use the same notation U 1 also for the function of one argument only. We could also have the same generality for U 2 , but this makes less sense from the economics point of view. We note that it is equivalent to define a contract as a functional F (u, v, X). In the hidden action case, which we study in a follow-up paper, a contract takes the form F (X). (x, u, v) .
(A3.) The admissible set A is the set of all those control triples (
(ii) For any bounded (∆C T , ∆u, ∆v) satisfying (i), there exist ε 0 > 0 such that
Remark 2.1 Our method also applies to the case in which u, v are constrained to take values in a convex domain, and/or in which the functions U i may only be defined on convex domains, such as power utilities. In this case, we would need to change the definitions of ∆C T , ∆u, ∆v. For example, we would define ∆u =ũ − u, whereũ is any other drift control satisfying (A3)(i), such that ∆u is bounded. Moreover, for our maximum principle conditions (2.21) to hold as equalities, we would need to assume that the optimal triple (Ĉ T ,û,v) takes values in the interior of its domain.
Remark 2.2
We will see that our sufficient conditions are valid for a wider set of admissible triples, with ε 0 = 0 in (A3).
Remark 2.3
If U 1 , U 2 have polynomial growth, the uniform integrability in (A3)(ii) automatically holds true. If they have exponential growth, there are some discussions on the integrability of exponential processes in Yong (2004) [14] .
Note that (2.1) has a unique strong solution: by (A3) (i) we have
Then by boundedness of |f x | and by standard arguments we get E{sup
) also satisfies (A3) (i). In fact, since f u and f v have uniform linear growth, we have
Thus (2.3) also has a unique strong solution.
We first consider the so-called first-best solution: in this setting it is actually the principal who chooses the controls u and v, and provides the agent with compensation C T so that the IR constraint is satisfied. In other words, the principal's value function is
In fact, in Section 3 we will prove that (under some conditions), if (Ĉ T ,û,v) is the optimal solution to this problem, then there is an implementable contract F such that u
To simplify the notations, from now on we abuse the notation and use V 2 to denote the right-hand side of (2.4). Also for simplicity, henceforth we use the notation for the case when all the processes are one-dimensional.
In order to solve the optimization problem (2.4), we define the Lagrangian as follows, for a given constant λ > 0:
Because of our assumptions, by the standard optimization theory (see Luenberger 1969), we have
for someλ > 0. Moreover, if the maximum is attained in (2.4) by (Ĉ T ,û,v), then it is attained by the same triple in the right-hand side of (2.6), and we have
Conversely, if there existsλ > 0 and (Ĉ T ,û,v) such that the maximum is attained in the right-hand side of (2.6) and such that
is also optimal for the problem V 2 of (2.4).
Necessary conditions for optimality
We cannot directly apply standard approaches to deriving necessary conditions for optimality, as presented, for example, in the book Yong and Zhou (1999) [15] , because our optimization problem has a non-standard form. Thus, we present here a proof starting from the scratch.
Fix λ and suppose that (C T , u, v) ∈ A and (∆C T , ∆u, ∆v) is uniformly bounded. Let ε 0 > 0 be the constant determined in (A3) (iii). For ε ∈ (0, ε 0 ), recall (2.3) and denote
Moreover, let ∇X be the solution to the SDE
where
way. By (A1) and (A3) (i) one can easily show that
Thus (2.8) has a strong solution ∇X t such that E{ sup
The following lemmas show that the finite difference quotients in (2.7) converge.
Lemma 2.1 Assume (A1) and (A3) (i). Then lim
Proof. First, by standard arguments one can easily show that
Next, we note that
By (A1) and the fact that ∆u, ∆v are bounded, there exists a constant C > 0 independent of ε such that
(2.10)
≤ C, and ∆u, ∆v are bounded, we have
Recall (2.9) and that f x , f u , f v are continuous. Thus, by (2.10) and the Dominated Convergence Theorem we get E{sup 
Corollary 2.1 Assume (A1)-(A3). Then
We next prove the convergence of ∇J ε . By (A3) (ii) we know ∇J is well defined. Note that 
It is then straightforward to verify that the random variable
Using this we get, for a generic constant C,
Note that (A3) (ii) also holds true for variation (0, ∆u, ∆v) (maybe with differenent ε 0 ). Recalling Lemma 2.1 and (2.12), we conclude that V ε are uniformly integrable on ε ≤ ε 0 , for a small enough ε 0 , and applying the Dominated Convergence Theorem we get lim
As is usual when finding necessary conditions for stochastic control problems, we now introduce appropriate adjoint processes as follows:
(2.14) Each of these is a Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (BSDE), whose solution is a pair of adapted processes (Y ) to the second BSDE also exists. Moreover, by the BSDE theory, we have
(2.15)
Theorem 2.1 Assume (A1)-(A3). Then
Proof. By (2.11) and (2.14), obviously we have
Recalling (2.8), (2.11) and (2.14), and applying Ito's formula we have 
Let n → ∞ in (2.20) and apply the Dominated Convergence Theorem to get
which, together with (2.17), proves the theorem.
For the future use, note that from the above proof we have
The following theorem is the main result of this section. 
then the last two maximum conditions become
(ii) The conditionΓ 1 T = 0 is a familiar optimality condition for risk-sharing, that appears in the literature in single-period models. 
which obviously proves the theorem.
We next show that the necessary conditions can be written as a coupled ForwardBackward SDE. To this end, we note that λ > 0. By (A2) we have
If we have strict inequality, then there exists a function F 1 such that for any x, g, value c = F 1 (x, g) is the solution to the equation
Similarly, for y 1 , y 2 > 0, and any (t, x, u, v), by (A1) we know that
is negative definite. If it is strictly negative definite, then there exist functions F 2 , F 3 such that for any y 1 , y 2 > 0 and any (t, x, z 2 ), values u = F 2 (t, x, y 1 , y 2 , z 2 ) and v = F 3 (t, x, y 1 , y 2 , z 2 ) are the solution to the system of equations 
Moreover, the optimal controls arê
Now by the definition of the processes on the left-hand sides of (2.22), we see that the right-hand sides are true.
Sufficient conditions for optimality
Let us assume that there is a multiple (
,û,v) that satisfies the necessary conditions of Theorem 2.2. We want to check that those are also sufficient conditions, that is, that (Ĉ T ,û,v) is optimal. Here, it is essential to have the concavity of f and −g. Let (C T , u, v) be an arbitrary admissible control triple, with corresponding X, G, and we allow now ε 0 = 0 in the assumption (A3). We have
By concavity of U i , the terminal conditions on Y i
, and fromΓ 1 = 0, or, equivalently, U 2 = λ∂ xÛ1 , suppressing the arguments of these functions, we get
Here, the second to last equality is proved using Itô's rule and the Dominated Convergence Theorem, and in a similar way as in the proof of Theorem 2. 
û,v) is an optimal triple for the problem of maximizing J(C T , u, v; λ).
Remark 2.5 There remains a question of determining the appropriate Lagrange multiplier λ, if it exists. We now describe the usual way for identifying it, without giving assumptions for this method to work. Instead, we refer the reader to Luenberger (1969) [7] . First, definẽ
Then, the appropriateλ is the one that minimizesṼ (λ) − λR, if it exists. If, for this λ =λ there exists an optimal control (Ĉ,û,v) for the problem on the right-hand side of (2.6), and if we have U 1 (Ĉ T , Gû ,v T ) = R, then (Ĉ,û,v) is also optimal for the problem on the left-hand side of (2.6).
Implementing the first-best solution
We now consider the situation in which the agent chooses the controls (u, v) . Although the conditionΓ 1 T = 0 determines the value of the contract C T at time T as a function of X T , G T , typically, it is not true that the contract can be offered as such a function, and still induce the agent to implement optimal (u, v).
We assume that the function U 2 is a one-to-one function on its domain, with the inverse function denoted
Note that the boundary condition
In the problem of executive compensation, this has an interpretation of the executive being payed by the difference between the stock value and a value I 2 (Y 2 T ) of a benchmark portfolio. We will see that the contract of this form indeed induces the agent to apply the first-best controls (û,v). We have the following
Definition 3.1 We say that an admissible triple (Ĉ T ,û,v) is implementable if there exists an implementable contract
Since we assume here that both the agent and the principal have full information, the first-best contract will be implementable, since the principal observes (u, v) and can punish the agent if she does not apply optimal (u, v). However, we now show that the optimal (u, v) can be implemented by a natural contract without direct punishment, which includes the framework studied in Ou-Yang (2003) [12] .
Proposition 3.1 Assume (A1)-(A3) and suppose that there existsλ > 0 so that the necessary conditions are satisfied withĈ
T ,û,v,X,Ĝ, Y 1 , Y 2 , Z 1 , Z 2 , that (Ĉ T ,
û,v) is admissible, and that the IR constraint is satisfied as equality, i.e.,
Then, the first-best triple (Ĉ,û,v) is implementable with the contract
In particular, it is sufficient for the principal to observe {W t } 0≤t≤T and X T in order to implement the first-best contract.
Proof: It suffices to show that (û,v) maximizes
Similarly as above for the principal's problem, denoting byỸ i /λ,Z i /λ the adjoint processes for the agent's problem, we can verify that the necessary and sufficient conditions for (ũ,ṽ) to be optimal for the agent are given by the system 
It is now easy to see thatĈ

Increasing State-Contingent Compensation and Uniqueness of Optimal Contracts
We have seen that the contract F (ω, X) = X T − I 2 (Y 2 T ) implements the first-best solution. However, in general, this is not the only contract that does that. In order to get uniqueness, we have to reduce the space of admissible contracts. One natural thing to do is to see whether we can have optimal contracts in the option-like form F (X T ), for some deterministic function F , as, for example, in Ross (1973) [13] . In Cadenillas et al. (2004) [1] , sufficient conditions are found under which there is a contract of such a form which attains the maximal possible utility for the principal, although it does not necessarily implement the first-best solution (û,v,Ĉ). Moreover, the conditions are quite strong, and in particular, there is no control u of the drift. We generalize their result in Example 4.4. In general, it is not possible to implement the first-best solution with the contracts of the form F (X T ). Instead, we consider the following contracts:
Definition 3.2 We say that a contract is of the Increasing State-Contingent Compensation (ISCC) type, if it is of the form F (X
is of the ISCC type, and we will show that it is the only contract which implements the first-best solution in that family. As mentioned above, the first-best contract can be implemented by a "dictatorial" contract, where the agent gets penalized by negative compensation if he does not use the first-best control. In practice, it is more natural, and consistent with real applications, to consider contracts of the ISCC type, where the payoff depends on the performance of the underlying process X compared to a benchmark. We have the following uniqueness result:
Proposition 3.2 Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.1 and if Range(X T ) = IR and
f u g u > 0, the contract F (ω, X) = X T −I 2 (Y 2
T ) is the only ISCC type contract that implements the first-best solution.
Proof: Introduce the agent's objective function, given a contract
is defined as earlier. Similarly as before, we can check that
We define the following two adjoint processes via BSDEs:
Then, we can also check similarly as before that
At the optimal (u, v), we have ∇A ≤ 0. Assume now that the contract F (X T ) − D T implements the first-best solution, so that (û,v,X T ) is the optimal solution to the agent's problem, and
for almost all (t, ω), but then by continuity also for t = T . Comparing with the necessary condition Γ 2 t =0 (see (2.16)), we have K
Then, from (3.5) and (2.14), we obtain
Thus, we can write
4 Examples Example 4.1 (One-dimensional, linear dynamics). We solve here one of the problems considered in Cadenillas, Cvitanić, and Zapatero (2003) [1] , and solved therein using a different approach. All other examples solved in that paper can also be solved using the approach of this paper, and in a more straightforward way, if we account for the modification of Remark 2.1. We are given
this is the case of portfolio management. We further discuss this case (also with a non-zero cost function g(t, X, u, v)), in more detail in examples below. The agent's utility is non-separable,
If there is a control u and penalty G T on it, the corresponding necessary and sufficient conditions are
, so that the maximum conditions become
(If there is no control u, then Y 1 = 0.) We assume that the first equality above has a unique solutionû, which is then constant. The second equality gives Y 2 t = zλ exp{− 1 2 α 2 t − αW t } for some z > 0, to be determined below. The optimal contract should be of the form
The value of z has to be chosen so that
. Then Z is a martingale with Z 0 = 1. We have
Z s f (û)ds has to be a martingale. The above system of necessary and sufficient conditions will have a solution if we can findv using the Martingale Representation Theorem, where we now consider the equation for ZX as a Backward SDE having a terminal condition
This BSDE has a solution which satisfiesX 0 = x if and only if there is a solutionλ > 0 of the equation
This is indeed the case in examples with exponential utilities U i (x) = − 
Example 4.2 (No drift control)
We consider now an example with no control u of the drift, thus f u = g = 0. We call this case the risk-sharing model. More precisely,
where W is one-dimensional. Assume that the contract F (X T ) − D T implements the firstbest solution. In (3.5) we have K 
The necessary condition for the agent is
and, from Γ 3 = 0 (see (2.16)), we also get
Solving the equations of K 2 and Y 2 we see that
This means, if Range(X T ) = IR, that we can write
for some positive constant k, which is arbitrary. From
This gives us the necessity part of the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1 In the risk-sharing model described above, if Range(X T ) = IR, if an ISCCtype contract can implement the first-best solution then it takes the form
with any positive number k. If in addition f (t, x, v) = αv, then any such contract, that also satisfies the IR constraint, implements the first-best solution.
Proof: It remains to show sufficiency, that is, the last statement. In this linear model we have f x = 0, f v = α, so that, from (4.2), the ratio
T is a constant. We then get, from (4.1), that
for some constants c 1 , c. However, this constant is determined uniquely from the IR constraint, that is, c = 1/λ. Thus, substituting F (X T ) − D T from (4.3) in (4.4), we get
which is the same as the first-best.
Notice that with f u = g = 0, the increasing state-contingent compensation is not quite unique, unlike the case of Proposition 4.1.
We now have the following result. 
where f is a deterministic function of (t, u, v), and r t is a given deterministic process. Assume exponential utility functions,
where g is a deterministic function of (t, u, v), and µ t is a given deterministic process. Denote
Then, it is seen that
We want to show that the optimalû,v are deterministic, and we want to see under what conditions we can offer a linear contract.
The maximum conditions give
T . We conjecture that optimalû,v are deterministic processes, and that
where h is a deterministic function of time. Using Itô's rule, it is easily verified that the above equality is satisfied if h is a solution to the ODE
We assume that µ and r are such that a unique solution exists. We get one equation forû,v by setting Γ 2 = 0 (see (2.16)):
Thus, the process
is a local martingale. We conjecture that it is a martingale for the optimalû,v. We will need below this representation for the first term of G T , obtained by integration by parts:
From the maximum condition λU 1 (C T − G T ) = U 2 (X T − C T ), we can verify that
We still want to see under what conditions we can offer a linear contract, using similar arguments as in the Proposition 4.1 and Corollary 4.1. Let us first see under what conditions the contract
implements the first-best solutionv for any positive k. If the agent is given the contract C k , the corresponding adjoint equations are
We see that
T . Similarly as before, we conjecture that the agent's optimal v is a deterministic process, and we can see that
where β is a deterministic function of time, with β being a solution to the ODE (4.7), but with
(4.14)
On the other hand, from
Substituting here I i (y) = − log(y)/R i , the expression (4.6) for X T , the expression (4.11) for the random part of G T , the expression (4.9) for Y 2 T , and comparing the random terms with the one in (4.14), we see that we need to have 
By Proposition 4.1 and Corrolary 4.1, in this model with g = 0, µ = 0, contract Ck is linear and it implements the first-best solution. Then, the principal will attain the first-best utility with the contract F (X T ).
Proof: Given such a contract, it can be shown as before that the agent's optimal procesŝ X is related to the adjoint process K 2 of (3.5), from which we get
It is easy to check that the product process ZX is a martingale, from which it followsk =ẑ, comparing to (4.18). From ODE (4.16) and (4.17), we then get
But then the principal's utility is equal to
which is the first-best.
Remark 4.2 Larsen (2005) computes numerically an optimal contract in this context, with power utilities, using a different approach. We provide here an alternative way to find an optimal contract, namely solving the above ODE. This would again have to be done numerically.
Conclusions
We have built a fairly general theory for contracting problems in models driven by Brownian Motion, and with full information. A question still remains under which general conditions the optimal contract exists. The recent popular application is the optimal compensation of executives. In order to have more realistic framework for that application, other forms of compensation should be considered, such as a possibility for the agent to cash in the contract at a random time (compensation of American options type). We leave these problems for future research.
